

The Political Orientation of the Middle and Lower Classes in Iran (1997-2013)

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Abstract

It is well-known that there is a positive relationship between class position and the political orientation of citizens. In such a way that the class position is considered as an independent variable and political orientations as dependent variables. In this research, we will try to survey the political orientations of middle and lower classes in Iran in the two states of Reformist and Principals, namely, the presidency of Khatami, and Ahmadinejad. *The main question is that the growth of the middle class tends to make progress in countries, but why the quantitative growth of this class in Iran, has not led to proper progress in our country? The hypothesis of this article is as follows: The growth of the middle class in the advanced countries is linked to their democratic political structures, while in the third world countries due to the rentierity, the middle classes are made by governments. Therefore, they cannot act independently and be effective in the political and cultural development of countries.*

Keywords: social class, middle class, lower class, political orientations, reformist government, fundamentalist government, contemporary Iran

1. Introduction

1.1 Definition of the Middle and Lower Class

To define the middle class, it is necessary to refer to the concept of the class. Then we will survey two combinations of "Middle Class" and "Lower Class."

A) The Concept of Class

The social classes are considered as distinct groups, that each of them consists of individuals who have common economic and social interests, which is against the interests of people belonging to the other classes. In general social class of each person is a variable that all information about her/him is summarized in, Attitudes and Values, Life Criteria, Level of Education, etc. (Abbott, Tyler, & Wallace, 2006).

The most important sociologists who worked in this field are Carl Marx and Max Weber. According to Marx, classes are determined by the economic conditions of individuals and the class can serve as a framework for living opportunities, forms of awareness and political interests, however the reduction of everything into the class and economy has been criticized in Marx's views, but the heavy shadow of this definition on the class with its economic and productive form is remaining. Weber, however, adds dignity (worthy) classes to economic classes. Nevertheless, the discussion of class and its relation to politics and power will remain in the domain of Marxist tendencies. What kind of class is compatible with what kind of political regime, Marxists considered the bourgeois class as suppressors and the proletariats as revolutionaries, and they played a historical role, but liberal writers have pointed to the positive role of this class in political and social evolutions. For example, Moore and Theda Skocpol point to the role of the bourgeois class in guide and tendency of political events, in Moore's view, there is an indivisible relationship between the middle class or the bourgeois and democratic regime. In other words, democracy always carries on the bourgeoisie's shoulders (Naghibzade, 2004). By looking at the history of the evolutions, it is also possible to

understand the important role of the middle class.

B) The Middle Class

The most influential class in political and social evolutions in the middle class. The middle class is a structural phenomenon which is tied up with political power. The middle class has a structural connection with both its peripheral classes (Upper and Lower Classes). So that in its historical and interactive process, it is constantly evolving, attracting and exchanging its social forces with these two classes. The study of relevant literature shows that two hardware and software attitudes have emerged about the middle class nowadays ("Middle Engine Development Engine of Iran," 17/05/2014).

In terms of hardware, the middle class can be distinguished by a certain subset. Like the old middle class, including the petite bourgeoisie and the yeomanry, as well as the new middle class, including Technocrats, The petite bourgeoisie, Movement and Labor organizations, Squirearchy, Aristocrats, Clergymen, Intellectuals and the Military personnel. In contrast, the software attitude, are merely composed of the visible and invisible roles of the middle class and individuals or groups with a common position in the economic or political system. Subjective factors and class consciousness should also exist as a prerequisite for class formation and the emergence of a class for themselves. Accordingly, it seems that in Iran, for the analysis of the middle class, more attention has been paid to hardware factors than to software, this has a conceptual meaning with the subjective nature of the middle class.

C) The Middle Class in Iran

The middle class is one of the most important social classes which has always played an important role since the constitutional and Reza-shah era and the modernization of Mohammad Reza Shah's regime and the formation of the Islamic Revolution; later in the period of *Construction and Reformist(note 1)*, the active presence of this class is visible. Therefore, for understanding these evolutions, it is important to understand the classes. So one of the main issues of political sociology is the construction of social classes, the recognition of the status and process of their formation. Concerning the importance of the socio-political role of the middle class, it is assumed that the upper classes of the society, the rich people, and the lower classes, cannot be effective as much as the middle class in society evolutions. The upper class may not have the opportunity to pay attention to the reformative thoughts, because usually, the existing socio-political order maintains their status quo, and also because they are usually busy with the process of wealth accumulation and its exploitation. As the lower class is also busy in the process of supplying the minimum living standards, pays less attention to social reforms. However, the middle class, on the one hand, in terms of comparative richness, is not involved with the wealth process and maintaining the status quo. Moreover, on the other hand, due to comparative poverty, there is no possibility of unlimited wealth accumulation, and they are not always busy with the economic process, so they have the opportunity to think more about the political, social, and cultural issues of society.

The members of the new middle class due to their job situations in cultural-administrative occupations are more focused than other social classes, and so they will deal more with the ideas of democracy and reform ("Time and day of the middle class in Iran," 2013/04/30).

Today, with widespread changes in the public domains which have carried out by the mass media, the role and function of the middle class have also been dramatically increased.

C.1 The Origin of the Middle Class

The origin of the middle class correlated to urban life and its requirements. However, apart from urbanization, the birth and growth of the middle class in the West was a coordinated and widespread process in various dimensions. In Western countries, capitalist development has led to the birth of a class that, in the welfare of the future, was able to convey its political, cultural, scientific, and religious interests. These reforms which known as the Renaissance(note 2), by changing the worldview and centralizing human, the rationality, and dissolving the political role of old organizations, such as church created a new lifestyle which the middle class was ruling in place of the fiefdoms and the church and dominated the kingdoms. Thus, the productive, capitalist, urban, and industrialist middle class conducted the process of changes, reforms, and modernization in Europe.

Moreover, through the Protestantism, Modernity, Capitalism, and the National Government established a modern society and government (Movasaghi, 2006). In Iran, however, some people have the idea that the middle class comes from rural areas. They survey it with the features such as instability, marginalization and intellectual turmoil, on the

one hand, and the latent protests, dissatisfactions, and lack of security feeling on the other hand ("Why have Iranian families become single-parented?," 2015/12/07). The middle class has an independent and well-known position in west countries which provides their effectiveness in society, but in the third world countries, including Iran, this process has not formed because of political and economic instability and dependency of the middle class to the government. The middle class in Iran is more reliant on the governments, and that's the reason that they are in the form of spectrums and layers that are shaky and unstable with no gravity center; because of the instability of politics and development in Iran, the traditional middle class is concerned about losing its own, and the new middle class is also concerned about losing its status and descending to the lower class.

In Iran, the middle-class has such a situation subjectively or objectively. In our society, bureaucratic levers (bureaucratic) and technocratic (technical) growth and development are in the hands of the layers and middle-class spectrum with no proper utilization of it.

Managing of our society should believe in this principle that, as long as the consumer, commercial, and brokerage economy does not turn into a productive and manufacturing-based economy, our problem will not be resolved (Ibid). A look at the position of the middle class in Iran shows that to go to a desirable situation, we have a long-distance away.

C.2 Iran's Middle-class Position

The quantitative and qualitative increase criterion evaluates the position of most countries in the world, so the countries are on the path of progress that their middle class has significant growth. However, in our country, the position of the middle class is not assessed desirably. Sanctions and inflation reduce the middle class's income. Applying policies such as paying subsidy put them in a weak position.

The World Economic Forum in part of its report states that Iran, with a 34% share, has a big class with average income but in recent years, the number of middle-class people has been reduced based on the average living standards (\$ 7.84 per day). This organization recommends to Iranian policymakers to deal with this problem, consider the quality of the education system, the productive jobs, the gender inequality in the education section and healthcare ("New middle class and economic-social modernization in Iran," 2014). With the economic downturn, the political and cultural situation of the middle class is not positively evaluated. The consumption of many cultural products, which are among the middle class's consumer items, has declined. The circulation of books has declined to 1,000 copies in recent years from 5,000 copies in ten years ago. The price of paper has led to a very high price for books and the press. According to the Counseling Department of the Ministry of Guidance, in Book Fair, the book sales declined 25 billion Tomans, which included children and teenagers, and even academic books. Reducing the average of numbers of households in the middle-class is a result of living costs increase. In fact, the households of this economic group, turned to a single child due to the increase in the costs of children's education and the health, and the relative importance of these issues in children's training, which predicted on this basis over the next few decades, the demographic share of this social class will be reduced compared to the upper and lower classes ("Why have Iranian families become single-parented?," 2015/12/07).

C.3 The History of the Middle Class in Iran

Historical conditions of the formation of the middle class in Iran, as in the most Third World countries, are different from Western countries. In the Western countries, first, the middle-class forms strengthen and forms the government, so the middle class creates the government and supervise it. However, in Iran, it was the government that built and supervised the middle class. In this historical path, when the government becomes ideological, certain groups are allowed to be active, and the rest are marginalized. Also, dependency on the government deprives the possibility of classes and groups' independent activity, and they forget their social-cultural mission, and instead of criticizing, they confirm and stabilize the status quo. We see this situation in our political history. The middle class was born at the same time as the constitutional revolution and tried to establish a democratic and legitimate government with the influence of evolutions(note 3) in western countries, but the constitutional monarchy was not appropriate for the middle class. As a result, "one of the main reasons for the defeat of the democratic revolution of the constitution in Iran was the lack of middle class or at least its weakness (Naghizade, 2004). After the constitutional defeat, the dependence period of the middle class on government starts from the Pahlavi era. Although a wide range of members of the new middle class, were using some of the available facilities, they were dissatisfied with the lack of democratic institutions, the existence of repression, censorship, increasing inequality and the corruption of the Pahlavi regime. As a result, a large part of the new middle class resisted the pseudo-modernist policies of the Shah's regime and in various sections and forms expressed their dissatisfaction with the existing political system. In addition to student strikes and protests that were publicly taking place by some intellectuals despite the dominant throbbing,

the various types of secret and semi-secret political groups were made up of members of the new middle class (Eyvazi Araghi, 1998). In the era of Mohammad Reza Shah, two major factors influenced the formation process of social classes: First, the regime's attempts to maintain the political system that was practically incoherence with the participation of the social classes and the second, the particular international conditions and the entrance of most of the world's countries in the modernization arena that aroused the sense of collective participation of the new middle class. The dual social-political conditions in the process of classifying brought the regime to particular dilemmas, and practically forced the government to adopt a dual policy on dealing with social classes and to act based on the maintenance of the royal system to control and harness the social classes. For this reason, in Mohammad Reza Shah's era, the government policies from the traditional and the new middle class never turned into a secure social base for the regime (Kazemi, 2016). This class was not only the basis of the regime but also with the effective presence among the opponents, led to the victory of the revolution. However, in most analyses, the presence of the middle class leads to a revolution, but the Islamic Revolution is called the oppressed people's revolution, and the middle class is marginalized. Although at the beginning, the concept of oppressed people has been referred to both the lower and middle classes but ultimately, the main slogans were restructured around a particular form of class orientation, namely the lower classes the so-called discolored revolutionaries and a kind of ideological struggle formed between the poor and the rich classes in the post-revolutionary Iran (Ibid). Therefore, some revolutionaries have been linked themselves to the lower classes in the role of the oppressed people's supporter and the middle class as the capitalist was hated in this era. In the Islamic Republic era, although the middle class due to population growth, especially in the first decade of the revolution, and the expansion of literacy and the development of higher education institutions throughout the country had a significant growth in comparison with the Pahlavi era, but over time, structural barriers and some policies led to the weakening of the middle class, the process of weakening of the middle class and the removal of forces after the revolution continued and led to the migration of vast sections of the intellectual and specialized forces. In those early days of the revolution due to tight control over individuals and groups belonging to the new middle class was applied by the relevant agencies, many experts, employees, students, and teachers chose to immigrate to Western countries on Iran. For example, the number of university professors dropped from 16,000 in the year 1978-79 to 9,000 in the academic year 1981-82, and more than 80,000 experts and intellectuals left the country (Ibid: 258). After the government of construction (Hashemi Rafsanjani), due to the economic development and relative social mobility that took place during this period, the interests of the new middle class were growing. These interests were mostly in the political arena and were including participation in political affairs, freedom of expression, criticism, and the rule of law. However, given the fact that the promotion of economic development and security in the investment itself created a lack of criticism (according to the Hashemi government's belief). Therefore, the policy of economic development of Hashemi Rafsanjani, on the one hand, promotes the development of higher education, the intellectual and the new middle-class population and on the other hand, the lack of freedom of political participation alienated educated and intellectual people from the political system and the government. For this reason, the construction government was unaware of the effect of modernization on politics, and this led to Khatami's win in the next election, whose motto was to open up the political space both inside and outside the country. Between 1997-2007, this was Iran's new middle class who was ruling. From the intellectuals to the middle-class parties, from journalists to technocrats based in the ministries and offices, the power was given to Iran's new middle class. In the presidential election 2005, the lower class of the society, with about 11 million votes in the first round of elections, showed its presence in Iran's political scene this time without an alliance with the middle class (Darabi, 2009). If in the 1997 elections, the lower and the new class (as part of the upper class) tended to Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, in the 2005 elections, the middle class separated from the lower class. The middle class, according to political and religious tendencies, voted to all four candidates, just as the lower class saw the motto of social justice in the discourse of two presidential candidates.

In the second round of the presidential election in 2005, a confrontation between the upper and middle class was against the lower class of society. This time, the middle class joined the upper class; on the contrary, in 1997, it was not on the lower class side. The result, however, illustrates the importance of the role of the lower class, with a great lesson for the new and urban middle class. It is as if the unity of the lower and middle class is only, which can evolve Iran's policy arrangement. In the elections of 2005, the economic gap was the basis of the electoral competition, and it was natural that the middle class grown up in eight years would not be very interested in the economic interests of the lower class of society. There were Economic and political gaps in 1997 when the alliance of these two classes to protest the status quo, in other words, the revolutionized middle class of 1997, in 2005 transformed into a conservative middle class. Between revolutionary and conservatism, there is a gap between the upper and lower class of the society. If we consider the upper class as the advocating of the status quo and the lower class against the status quo, the middle class is pendulous swaying, when it is weakened it goes toward the upper class to get the power by

the social power of this group, and when it becomes fat it supports the upper class to continue its political-economic life. It is the doctrines of the middle class. Until 2005, the way to power came from a coalition with the upper or some part of the upper class. With the closure of "Social Caste(note 4)," Ahmadinejad used the classical dialectic to get the power (Niakui, 2014). Another meaning of this may be that the transformation of the electoral arena into a class struggle requires removing the middle class from political equations. The coalition of this class is important to the other two classes, but the middle class is not a major controversy. Formation of the social classes disassembled at one time after the election of June 22, 2009. The middle class did not achieve its political demands, and for the second time, its alliance with the upper class failed against the lower class. At the same time, the common demands of this class led to their coherence for the eleventh presidential election of 2013 and the tenth parliament election in 2015.

With these commentaries, the major political forces in the coming years will engage in investing in the middle class to win the group's votes. The importance of the coalition of this class with the other two classes, while at the same time the pendulous feature of this class in the balance of social power, the political forces from the state to parties and institutions seeking power to reach the proper interaction and precise understanding of this class. If the reformers were seeking the middle class's vote in the form of the Participation Front(Jebhe Mosharekat) (note 5) and the Executives of Construction Party was trying to attract the upper class and (note 6)another part of the middle class's votes, but the story is different among the Principals (note 7).

Parties like Mutfilah (The Islamic Consultative Party(note 8)) have attracted high-ranking opinions over the past years in this camp. However, to win the middle class, a rigorous rivalry has taken place among Principals. On the one hand, Moderate Principals have put the communication and interactions with the middle class on their agenda such as Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf and Ali Larijani, one with the development of Tehran and the promotion of urban life's quality, greatly relied on the trust of this class and the other one by adopting moderate policies in domestic and foreign policy, considers to improve the situation of this group. On the other hand, elites such as Saeed Jalili and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in addition to being rooted in the lower classes of the community, seek to build trust among this class. Similar to the rebuilding of the 1997 election model, in this hypothesis, a choice is made between the middle-to-lower class and the real middle class, but the result is the formation of a new class that has a common desire. The most important point in shaping the new class is to pay attention to the common desire. Perhaps in the midst, the collapse of the middle class and the fattening of the lower class would form a common ideology among them. However, what is the guarantee that a class will not be transmuted in another class?

The arrangement of political forces, especially among Principals, should not only be sought about the middle class but the projects such as class combination cannot be ignored.

Whatever the projects are, but the middle class has features such as coquetry and deception, both together. Coquetry without loyalty is the manner of the new middle class. After the end of the war, attention to the economy during the Hashemi Rafsanjani construction's era led to the growth of capitalism and the middle class. However, Iran's economic system remained under the domination of institutions that directly or indirectly belonged to the state and led by a very limited circle of people close to the Hashemi Rafsanjani's government. During this period, despite the quantitative growth of this class, the government did not pay much attention to their aspirations and demands.

Moreover, the classification of the majority of the middle class to insider and outsider isolated them from the system. However, a part of the modern forces belonged to the middle class were absorbed into the system to reduce the traditional and ideological faces of the system in the form of modern groups. The group of construction agents formed as the representatives of the middle class after the revolution, that was born inside the system in 1995. These were the Discalced and pre-revolutionary masses who could use the economic and educational opportunities provided by the revolution and joined the new middle-class circle. The economy was their main motto (Ibid). This paradoxical situation continued in the other areas as well, for example, it emphasized on the production and industry, but the volume of imports was increasing. Privatization and rentiry and paying attention to consumption patterns instead of ethical and social values have placed the middle class in a vague state and forced them to look for other patterns to answer their political concerns and demands instead of the economy these demands formed around democratic concepts and Khatami's political development.

C.4 The Middle and Lower Class Political Tendencies in Iran

The middle-class political tendencies have been largely based on democratic concepts and its conveyors, namely intellectuals, journalists, and bureaucrats. Having the least material interests and political awareness makes this class able to meet its demands at the community level. It is clear that if the middle class, in terms of basic material enjoyment (mainly at the level of food, housing, clothing, transportation, health, and education) be able to supply

relatively its initial needs will go towards cultural enjoyment ("Time and day of the middle class in Iran," 2013/04/30). For the improvement of the middle class, the pursuit of production, consideration to the rule of law and meritocracy, the pursuit of research and development, the avoidance of affectation and demagoguery, the creation of social security and the provision of social, political and cultural participation of social groups can be effective. Because the middle class concerning its interests is more sensitive to its immaterial shortcomings, that the most important case can be the political participation ("Why have Iranian families become single-parented?," 2015/12/07).

D). The Khatami Reformist Period

The reformist period is closely linked to the period of Construction, because on the one hand, paying attention to the economy led to the growth of the middle class and on the other hand highlighted the political priority. The Second Front of Khordad, with the political and democratic discourse of Khatami, was a reformist movement with the broad participation of the new urban middle class, intellectuals, scholars, women, and youths, and in continuation of the Constitutional Movement, the National Movement (note 9) and the Islamic Revolution of 1978, was about the revival of the Revolutionary Project for the liberation deeper and more conscious (Movasaghi, 2006). Khatami's plans were based on concepts such as freedom, democracy, the relationship between religion and democracy, civil society, reforms and public participation, and consideration for the political parties and groups, and briefly opening up the political, cultural and social space. Cultural tolerance and opening the political space inside the country as well as the detente and dialogue of civilizations out of the country accompanied by confidence-building, resulted in economic and cultural flourishing. The growth of political culture with the détente in international relations led to economic prosperity, and per capita income of Iranians increased from 698 thousand riyals by the end of 1996 to 866 thousand rials at the end of 2004 and by controlling the inflation rate and a kind of stabilization of the economy of Iran, the inflation rate reduced from 25.5% in the years 1989-94 to 15.7% in the years 1997-2004 (Movasegh, 2001). Two years after the victory of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, the expansion of the press became as one of the indicators of political development. In 1999, 2 million copies of the daily newspaper were published in Iran, which was unexampled in the history of the press.

However, the achievement of the middle class in this period was not favorable to the political and economic demands. Khatami's merit was confronted with insider and outsider and second-class citizen's thesis of his rivals and removing the vast forces of this class with the audits, closing newspapers and magazines, censoring and physical removing the writers, known as chain killing is only a part of the damage of the pressure groups on the middle class. With the defeat of the reformist discourse, Ahmadinejad's Principlists comes to power.

E). The Ahmadinejad 's Period

Ahmadinejad's era as the ninth government with the motto of the revival of Islamic values and principles that are known as fundamentalism against the conceptual and structural with the reformist government. Ahmadinejad's government focused on economic issues instead of political development, and in this approach, lower classes were considered instead of the middle class. The central economic index of fundamentalist government was marking off a forgotten issue in previous governments, that is the social justice and the drawing of a justice-centered economy instead of a growth-oriented economy which includes decentralization, provincial trips and attention to the problems of different parts of the country, endless endeavors, efforts to achieve social justice and eliminating discrimination, and reduce class distances, orientation towards housing and employment problems' solving ,taking appropriate decisions in this regard and attention to industry sectors and the expansion of public services, attempts to implement Article 44 of the Constitution and privatization and reduction of government size, cost-reducing approach in government sectors, and consistent efforts to target subsidies ("The Tenth Government Performance (How did the tenth government function?)," 2012/12/22).

On the one hand, the targeting of subsidies not only made the last stroke to the middle class, but its negative impact on the low-income groups is undeniable. The targeting of subsidies was discussed due to problems such as high consumption and low efficiency of energy, smuggling large quantities of fuel from the borders of the country, and the financial pressure of subsidies payment of energy burden to the government. On the other hand, to be fairer in distributing subsidies and an increase in the share of poor people were announced to implement this plan and in January 2009, it was approved by Parliament. Moreover, its first phase began in December 2010. The sharp increase in inflation caused by the implementation of the first phase and the increase of the sanctions exchange rates, led to one of the goals of the plan that was to improve the welfare state of low-income families by using a more fair

distribution of subsidies faced to the challenge and after a while not only the position of the welfare of low-income families was not improved, but also in the face of severe inflation and the recession of the productive units the situation of many of them became worse.

Producer inflation initially increased by 30% and up to 40% in the early months of 2011 (Zibakalam, Afshari, & Aslanzadeh, 2010). Finally, the rural social welfare indicators during the years 2005-2011 have been decreasing in the country and collapse of families under the poverty line have been increasing. According to some supporters, Ahmadinejad's government has paid special attention to the cultural issue and the neglect of political lobbies, and the switch to the resolution of the basic problems of the people was an important feature of the Principals government. However, Ahmadinejad's workbook in this section is even dark for his followers. Paying attention to Iranianism, instead of Islamism, was not interesting for fundamentalists. Also, the cases of doctoral scholarships without a test is an example of the destruction of the scientific community, which was attempted to consider the protection of values and their servants. They considered one of the most important criteria for student admission to show loyalty in sensitive periods and different stages of the revolution, and the lack of attention is considered as clear discrimination and oppression to the servants of the system (Ibid: 67). Based on economic claims, the ninth government in an environment free of political contradictions should try to improve the economy of low-income groups. However, with a challenging approach in the international arena that brought the international community to a confrontation with Iran and led to the approval of statements and sanctions, whose negative effects on the middle class and the poor is undeniable. Because the middle class is weakened when parties, unions, syndicates, and institutions of people are not active and populist attitudes are dominant on the society (Shrybany, 2007). In the Ahmadinejad era, the middle class has been weakened, and the government has often tried to identify the demands of the lower classes as the focus of public demands in Iran. These policies, whose main characteristic is the direct payment of economic subsidies, has not succeeded, and it seems that the idea that economic development is a product of the coalition of the state and the middle class has still advocates ("Time and day of the middle class in Iran," 2013/04/30).

With the power of the middle class, we see significant changes; Because the most important characteristic of the middle class that distinguishes them from other classes is the acceptance of social and political changes and the culture of tolerance and transparency. However, the main problem remains. Because of the rentierity of countries such as Iran, we are faced with the lack of independence and unity of the middle class, which allows analysts to predict middle-class behavior, the scrutiny of the middle-class layers also reflects the blockade and complexity of the interior, which makes us difficult to understand the political behaviors of this class.

F). The Layering of Middle Classes

The middle class was divided into traditional and new classes, but nowadays, with this change, this division is not responding, and people like Jalaei Pour refer to seven middle-class layers, some of which contain positive elements of the middle class and some are against it. The first layer is the traditional middle class, or shopkeepers, and sellers. At the same time, this group is the core of power in the country and the core of political power. The second layer; the middle-class layer; these are effective in terms of finding a role in the distribution of rentier resources. This group is in power in the economic field, and maybe in other areas. The core of power wants to be this middle-class stratum, but it is in its own hands and does not necessarily bear the civil and democratic demand. This group includes those who take the resources and facilities of the country under the title of privatization, or it is theirs. The fact that in recent years, major economic holdings like the security forces retirement agencies and the Khatam Engineering Center (note 10) were defending was intended to create a middle class. The third layer consists of a group with a relatively wide range in Iran; an administrative middle class. Professionals in this layer, such as senior experts and specialists, are not influential forces for the government. This group is not very much like the previous layer; in fact, they lived two lives. It means that they have a bi-administrative and a living outside the workplace. The fourth layer, which is a really important part, includes professionals and services, The society needs this group, and therefore the core of the government has a lot of its own. This layer is considered as a positive middle class for political power. The fifth layer refers to the real bourgeois real estate (i.e., those with land and building sales), not the engineers who make the buildings. The sixth layer is the same producers who, unfortunately, have been severely hit in recent years. The people of this layer are more supportive of civilization, the elections are important to them, and they are mainly pursuing political issues. These can reflect the middle class with the same positive charge from political sociology. The seventh layer, the layer is a rentier fixer (Bagmen Layer), and their skill is in working for different parts of society about power. This class is economically well-equipped and even capable of being transferred to the upper class. They are among the people. Mutability is visible among them (Renani, 2014/06/16). This layering, although

long, is well illustrated by the plurality and differences within the Iranian middle class, which has resulted in a lack of accessibility, transparency, and ultimately in the middle-class vulnerability.

G). Middle-Class Pathology

In most rentier countries, the dependency of the middle classes has prevented them from pursuing their political and social demands. To the extent that some people do not consider the independence of the middle class and they are considering it in line with other classes. Abbas Kazemi calls this class the oppressed class, and Reza Samim also links it with the traditional cultural life of the elite (Ibid: 121). According to these writers, the middle class in Iran has failed to adhere to the noble values of this class; instead of cultural values and civic demands, they are more concerned with economic values, and as a result of the upstart (parvenus) class, which consumerism is one of the main characteristics of it. The Islamic Revolution also showed that this class did not have the cultural characteristics and the historicity as expected from the bourgeoisie, and insensitive passages, it is solved in the aspirations of other classes instead of moving by the culture of the middle class (Samim, 2005).

G.1 Middle-class Economic Pathology

Most analysts consider political instability as an economic obstacle to the growth of the middle class. This class has been seriously damaged in recent years due to increased economic pressure. The middle class, based on its characteristics, give great importance to cultural and social issues, but in recent years, especially with the enforcement of targeted subsidy laws, there has been high inflation in the market, but, on the other hand, salaries and wages have not grown in proportion to inflation. On the other hand, middle-class families, unlike families of simple workers or farmers, do not have a large population, and direct subsidies from the government, do not help them in providing living expenses. The economic pressure makes the middle class down to the level of the lower classes, so the cultural, scientific affairs, and social and political concerns will be excluded from their priorities. Because one of the factors of the growth of the middle class is economic stability and prosperity, the middle class is not formed in instability and does not grow, as it can be destroyed by inflation. A bad turn is taking place; inflation eliminates morality and instability increases inflation ("Damage and challenges to marginalization," 06/05/2016). Instability and Political-economical insecurity have led to the neglect of cultural indicators and will lead to the collapse of society in the long run. In this case, even economic recovery cannot have a significant effect, because the improvement of the economic conditions must be appropriate to the political and cultural growth. In recent years, we have seen the rapid growth of the middle-class economy, but at the same time, our middle-class cultural growth has slowed. It suggests that the middle-class economy has not become, so appropriate as social and cultural middle class. So the middle class is also being destroyed. We have two economic and cultural classes in our society, at first, an economic class is created, and then a part of this class becomes a middle-class culture. However, at the time of destruction, both are destroyed together (Ibid).

G.2 Middle-class Cultural Pathology

The relationship between the two economic and cultural categories has caused morality and culture the first victim in times of economic crisis. Over the past years, the pressure from inflation and sanction has become apparent to middle-class culture. The list of such things that makes the middle class vulnerable include: high education and training costs, healthy recreational expenses, and medical expenses. In some specific diseases, the only cost of a patient's medicine for a month is several million Tomans, which is very difficult for middle-aged families. The middle class cannot easily meet the sums and cannot see the suffering and loss of family members. Therefore, it will pay the costs in any order but will lose its assets, and it is very likely that after a treatment costs, it will be pulled below the poverty line ("Middle Engine Development Engine of Iran," 17/05/2014). By increasing these costs, the middle class is forced to remove or declining items from its consumer basket. Cultural attractions such as going to the cinema, theater, museums, and conferences and buying books and magazines, as a result of the low level of reading and writing of books and other cultural products and businesses in the country. This situation is due to a reduction recreation such as travel, may create depression and crisis mental and behavioral spirit in this class. Traveling is one of the middle-class entertainments. Individuals affiliated with the middle class are interested in cultural and educational trips. However, the increase in living expenses resulting from the implementation of the targeted subsidy plan has made them more cautious in allocating funds for travel. A large percentage of middle-class households have cut their number of trips to provide essential and indispensable expenses. With no government support, the middle class will leave the government alone in its plans. For example, people voted for Mr. Rouhani, but when the same elected government asks them not to register for subsidies, It was expected tens of millions of middle class not registered but did not join the government plan (Ibid). The fact that the scientific community, which

is part of the middle class, makes the state's program behind requires extensive pathology. However, in short, it refers to some cases.

G.3 Middle Class's Scientific Pathology

The middle class is the main carriers of science and expertise in our country and every other country. One of the reasons for the growth of the middle class in the population is the rapid growth of the universities and graduates and the scientific results of these groups. However, in Iran, for a long time, we are faced with the commodification of science, atmospheric science sickness, loss of quality of education, scientific-saving benefit of academic credentials. Excessive use of universities, especially in the form of Azad universities, Elmi-Karbordi and Payam-e-Noor it is said to universities to be more economic chambers with a profound understanding of the university (Kazemi, 2016). Abbass Kazemi calls this a "collegiate proletariat" in which the university and student move away from their goal and become employed by the research slave. Students spend their lives selling theses and research to other students, without having the advantages and disadvantages. Apart from the university's decline, faculty and intellectuals, the intellectuals are severely damaged as the main body of the middle class in addition to the university's decline. Elites are the most important part of the middle class. In the last century, Iranian intellectuals played a significant role as community culture brokers in familiarizing the masses with modern civilization and modernization. Of course, the positions and activities of the intellectuals have been different ups and downs. Surrendering to Western civilization, the attempt to reconcile tradition and renewal, deny the West's civilization, was one of their different positions (Sheikhzadeh, 1384:94). Intellectuals were constitutional monitors but gradually gave their seats to the military. Their failure has not ended here, and in the following cases, the trend continued. In the 1960s, Iranian intellectuals were the heritage of the unrelenting frustrations that arose from the defeat of the Iranian national movement. The traditional Qajar tyranny was transformed into a modern dictatorship, and in this terrible transformation of the constitutionalist intellectuals played an important role (Qouchani, 2014). With the defeat of the constitutionalists and the Mossadeq, (note 11) the way is opened for the Left-wing and radical intellectuals. A range of outspoken intellectuals are becoming other intellectuals, and they are engaging in hypothetical hostility and intellectual formation. Darius Ashouri refers to it as Resentment. (note 12). This phenomenon or nemesis is formed in the face of historical backwardness, and the intellectual finds its history of magnanimous actions, government, and people. Hate this or that historical appreciation. When the intellectual class gets caught up with the malice, he or she constantly hurts and torments itself. More or less, all of the excellence of our contemporary literature, especially contemporary poets, including Shamloo, Akhavan Saleth, and Forough, kept constantly hurting and complaining at something. Everyone is saddened by grim determination. Everyone is waiting for change. All expect for the lifesaver. These are signs of Resentment (Renani, 2015). By passing the middle class of academic interests and academic assemblies, we see a kind of rotation in the consumption pattern of this class which instead of paying attention to cultural goods, it is considering mass consumer goods.

G.4 The Pattern of Middle-class Consumption

The pattern of middle-class consumption in Iran seems to have turned from cultural products to consumer products. Perhaps the diminution of social and political participation in the countries of the rentier will make the middle class seek to change its consumption patterns. Today, the middle class enters mass consumption and is, in fact, a form of mass consumption. The poor are not claiming industrial goods because they cannot afford it; the rich will not be a mass consumer of manufactured goods because their demand is mainly for luxury goods. It is a middle class, which is a mass consumer for ordinary industries and conventional technologies (Ibid). Sometimes it is the middle class who has come to compete with the rich and consumes luxury goods with the rich which ultimately makes this situation financially vulnerable in the medium term and endangers it in the long run. Depending on the false earnings generated by consumer loans, the monetary turnover and false occupations caused by these flows, they will be changed and, with the crisis, will be very likely to become poor. The worst policies in this regard are creating false monetary revenues that exacerbate consumerism and make this social group worse. Because the middle class is generally not well-positioned to manage its long-term, medium-term, and long-term limited capital or to make good use of its savings (Almond, 1965).

H). Middle Class and Social Networks

Another major change in the pattern of middle-class consumption is the use of social networks and virtualization. Increasing social networks, given the positive and negative effects, has transformed it into a community of threat. Meanwhile, the middle class is more vulnerable to threats because of the main audience of these networks. Iran is among the twenty-first countries in the world to benefit citizens from the Internet, which ranked thirteenth in the

world. Expansion of the use of the Internet in Iran has been even more rapid than in some other countries. While in 2000, only 250,000 Iranians used the Internet, they reached 45 million at the beginning of 2014, and now they are even more. Many Iranians use the Internet, while many social networks and websites have been refined in Iran (Sadeghizadeh, 2016). The implications of using this volume of the Internet have led to the formation of fluid and non-controllable culture. This large-scale use of the Internet will affect socialization and social and political affiliation of individuals. Changing the pattern of political follow-up and shifting from the gravity of political behavior from traditional civilian mores, such as mosques, delegations, parties and associations to virtual civil society is just one corner of the effects of this new culture which is referred to as the epigram of the political affair. One of the most important influences of new social networks on contemporary Iranian political culture is the increasing epigram of the political affair. As long as the users of these networks have gained a great deal of skill in revealing the most serious political issues (Renani, 2015).

2. Conclusion

Frequently, scholars have a direct relationship between the status of class and the political orientations of citizens. The upper classes and the rich are conservative in the political arena for the sake of maintaining their wealth, and they want to maintain the status quo. The lower classes are also unable to play a role in political activities due to plight economic conditions. The middle class, having intellectual and moral independence, has an active presence in political affairs and social change, so there is a significant relationship between the growth and development of countries and the middle class. Our main question was why the growth of the middle class in Iran had not made any progress in our country? This article hypothesizes that there is a direct relationship between the growth of the middle class and the type of government. In the Pahlavi government, despite economic growth, we did not have an independent middle class, because the rentier of the government made the groups dependent on the government and prevented their growth and development. This lack of independence continued in subsequent periods and the Islamic Republic system. Because the state's rentier nature has not changed in both the present and the past governments. In other words, what has changed is the ideology of political regimes and not their rentier nature. Governments in Iran have always been generous by subsidizing certain classes and creating a middle class dependent on the government, who, instead of their historical mission, are considering material benefits and protecting their privileges. As in the subsidy program, the middle class left the government alone. Although the growth of the middle class in advanced countries is linked to their democratic political structures, it is believed that in countries like Iran, the middle classes are being built up by governments because of their rentierity. So, the middle classes cannot act independently and be effective in the political and cultural development of countries.

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Notes

Note 1. The construction period refers to the two presidential terms Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, which includes the fifth and sixth governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which commenced its activities on August 1, 1989, and the end of August 12, 1997. The implementation of the first five-year post-revolution economic development program was carried out in this government. The open economic policy and anti-monopoly laws have been one of his most effective measures.

Note 2. Renaissance (Renaissance), or the period of renaissance, or the period of renaissance, or the period of revitalization, was an important cultural movement that initiated a period of the scientific revolution and religious reform and the development of art in Europe. Renaissance is a medieval and new era. For the first time, the term "Renaissance" was used by the French in the 16th century. The beginning of the newborn period dates back to the 14th century in northern Italy. In the 15th century, this movement also traveled to northern Europe. Renaissance, a 300-year-old transformation that began in Florence in Italy, led to the Enlightenment in Europe. The Renaissance began in Italy in the 1300s and spread throughout Europe over three centuries. Rarely, in such a brief period of history, various events take place, while these centuries are full of fundamental changes and great activities.

Note 3 The constitutional movement, the constitutional movement, the Constitutional Movement, the Constitutional Revolution, or the Constitutional Revolution, are the set of efforts and events that led to the signing of the Constitutional Order by Mozaffaroddin Shah Qajar on August 14, 1285, and continued until the Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar period to convert the autocratic government to constitutional government, which led to the formation of the National Assembly and the adoption of the first constitution of Iran.

Note 4 Caste is a social system. In this system, social benefits are distributed according to assigned roles. In the Caste system, members in different rankings do not have the right to pass on to other rank and must observe special conditions in their behavior and actions and relations with other members of the rankings. [Needed Source] Castells is an affair and is anti-merit. Based on the report, UNICEF and Human Rights Watch have affected 250 million people around the world

Note 5. The Islamic Iran Participation Front is one of the first parties that was established after the Iranian presidential election (1997), which during the government of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, with nearly half of the members of the reform cabinet, and also having the largest party fraction during the parliament Sixth, as well as the study and establishment of active party offices in all provinces and most of the country's cities, was named one of the most challenging and most effective parties of post-revolutionary history in terms of political, social and cultural relations of Iran.

Note 6. The Executives of Construction of Iran Party is a reformist political party in Iran, founded by 16 members of the cabinet of the then-President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in 1996. The party is a member of Council for coordinating the Reforms Front.

Note 7. Following the victory of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami in the Seventh Presidential Election in 1997, the reformist was used to name his supporters and groups. The reformists used the term conservative for their opposite.

For reformists, the second informal term of the Khordadians was also used. In response to the reformists, the contrast spectrum used the term "principals" to describe themselves. In the events associated with the tenth presidential election, the reform process was called the Green Movement, and the Constitutionalists used the term "sedition" to refer to reformists [requiring source] and protesters to the tenth election results. After the tenth presidential election, differences and multiplicities in the course of fundamentalism intensified and became more intense over time. As far as these differences ended at the end of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's second administration, he reached its highest level since the formation of the fundamentalist faction

Note 8. The Islamic Consultative Party (former names: the Islamic Compact and the Islamic Compact) is a political-religious party in Iran, which was named after the three coalitions of the three religious groups in 1963: the board of the mosque Aminaldoul, the Shaikhli mosque, and the Esfahani Board, Followed by Sayyid Ruhollah Khomeini. The organization tends the right-wing and traditional principals, representing the "religious bazaar" in the Iranian political environment. The party is also active in the field of charity and the establishment of institutions such as the Islamic School and Qarzul Hassaneh funds. At the time of the creation, the compulsory committees were strongly influenced by the ideas of Sayyid Ruhollah Khomeini, who played for the first time on the demonstrations of June 15, 1942, and the assassination of Hasan Ali Mansour and in the 1979 revolution, they also acted against the Pahlavi regime. After the victory of the revolution and the formation of the Islamic Republic, they became the most coherent political force of the right-wing and were one of the most influential factions in the Islamic Republic Party, which at least until the end of the first decade of the revolution, retained this position.

Note 9. The National Resistance Movement was a movement that began after the coup of August 28, 1953, and continued until July 30, 1960 (the formation of the second national front). After the August 28, 1932 coup and the arrest of loyal leaders to Dr. Mosaddegh, the activities of the Iranian National Front were stopped and some of its activists continued to fight the government by forming a national resistance movement. The goal of this movement was to defend the achievements of the nationalization of the oil industry against the established governments after the collapse of the national government of Mohammed Mossadeq. On the night after the coup, the Iranian People's Party forms a meeting and supports Mohammad Mossadegh. The initial idea of creating an organization to confront the coup came to the mind of Mohammad Nakhshab, and by negotiating with Seyyed Reza Zanjani with the presence of Hussein Shah Hussein and Ibrahim Karim Abadi, they were able to take the first steps in a post-coup dictatorship. The primary core of the National Resistance Movement was Mohammad Nakhshab, Hossein Shah Hoseini, Sayed Reza Zanjani, and Ibrahim Karimabadi.

Note 10. It is a subsidiary of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is currently the "largest contractor of Iranian government projects." The construction site of Khatamalanbay was formed after the end of the Iran-Iraq war on the orders of Seyyed Ali Khamenei and with the order of Mohsen Rezai, whose purpose was to establish "water supply, the export of oil and gas, damming, water and power and road construction projects."

Note 11. Mohammad Mossadegh, born May 29, 1258 (in accordance with the birth certificate), or June 26, 1261 (according to some historians) in Sanglai, Tehran - died March 14, 1965, Najmiyeh Hospital Tehran during the Qajar period known as *Mirza Mohammad Khan Mosaddgh al-Saltanah* was enacted before the adoption of the law prohibiting the use of the title, then known as Dr. *Mossadegh*, a politician, a lawyer, a representative of eight periods of the National Assembly, governor, minister and two prime ministers. Mohammad Mosaddeq is the first Iranian holder of a doctorate in law. During the transfer of monarchy from Qajar to Pahlavi, Mossadegh was disappointed, although he was disappointed with the Qajar regime. Considering that he knew that Reza Shah created a state based on dictatorship, He opposed this, and later he was one of the ruthless critics of Reza Shah. During the reign of Reza Shah, Mossadegh went to jail and spent some time in exile. He regarded Pahlavi as the origin of British politics. After the fall of Reza Shah, he returned from exile to politics. In 1949, he joined several parties and, in cooperation with people like Hossein Fatemi, set up the National Front of Iran. The national front, and at the head of them, Mossadegh, suggested the nationalization of the oil industry on the proposal of Fatemi to begin colonialization in Iran. Mossadegh became prime minister in 1951, and in the first step, he nationalized Iran's oil.

For this reason, the plan for the fall of his government by the United Kingdom (who was the main owner of Iranian oil before the nationalization of Iran) was eventually ended up in the CIA's August 28 coup, the Mossadeq government illegally, while Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Strongly opposed Mosaddeq, calling for the fall of the Mossadeq government, was abolished. Another reason for the fall of his government was the opposition of Abolqasem Kashani to Mossadegh. While previously supporting Mossadeq, Kashani, along with a large number of clerics, opposed Mossadegh. Mossadegh was then tried in a military court and sentenced to three years in solitary confinement, despite the documentary defense he pleaded. After three years in prison, Mossadegh was exiled to

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to Ahmedabad Castle and was monitored there until his death, and "every day he wished to die." Mossadeq eventually On March 14, 1963, she died under the influence of cancer at the age of 87 at the Nājmieh Hospital of Tehran under the supervision of SAVAK officers, and was buried in Ahmedabad for her refusal to bury her by her will alongside those who died in the Revolt. Mosaddeq was one of the pioneers of the contemporary anti-colonial movement, who, not only in Iran but also among the Third World countries, also described him as brave and with astonishing stubbornness against British colonialism. Mosaddeq was a supporter of the Iranian constitutional revolution and believed that the Shah should only be a symbol of unity. During the prime minister's time, Mossadegh tried to limit the Shah's power to the constitutional framework specified in the constitution. During this period, Mohammad Mossadegh was the supreme power of the country (relative to the king). Mossadeq, who at the time of the prime minister managed to fully implement the constitution and restrict the power of the king and the royal family, was still a critique of Muhammad Reza Shah's rule after the August 28 coup. At the time of his prime minister, the royal family (especially Ashraf Pahlavi) were Mossadegh arrogant opponents. The researchers believe that the search for the root of the 1979 Iranian Revolution could be returned to the August 28th coup. Although Mohammad Reza Pahlavi called the August 28th coup d'état the uprising of the people and the national resurrection of Iran. However, sixty years after the CIA's August 28 coup, with the publication of documents, its direct involvement in Iran was acknowledged. Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh was a passionate and colonialist liberal figure who influenced the countries of the Middle East, such as Egypt. He was the first Middle Eastern statesman to raise the flags of the economic struggle with colonial powers with the implementation of the nationalization of the oil industry. Hence, in the Middle East, he was referred to as Zaim al-Sharq, and even Jamal Abdul Nasser called the street in Cairo named Mohammed Mossadegh, now called this name. In various ways, he was an example for Middle Eastern nationalists like Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Note 12. A sense of resentment, hostility and perhaps jealousy directed at that which one identifies as the cause of one's frustration, an assignation of blame.