Board Rudiments and the Executive Attitude Towards Corporate Risk-Taking

Bello Lawal


This paper examines the effect of key board distinctiveness on managerial risk-taking behaviour. Using a total sample of 121 firms made up of 1,166 corporate directors and 847 firm-year observations, the study finds robust evidence across the three stages of estimation that suggests power separation in terms of CEO non-duality is negatively associated with executive risk-taking due to enhanced board assertiveness and independence. Board size is inversely associated with the variability of market value measure both within and at inter-firm levels. With average board membership in the study sample made up of 10 directors, the study finds crucial empirical evidence that points to the key benefits of large board configuration including the social capital, diversity of thoughts, knowledge, and experience, effectiveness and vigilance which curtails executive entrenchment. In contrast, the paper records positive association between the presence of foreign directors and corporate risk-taking. Due to their wealth of experiences, foreign directors tend to have more strategic sense of purpose and are likely not to hesitate in taking appropriate risk decisions when it really matters. While the paper finds little evidence that suggests a within-firm positive relationship between board independence and managerial risky propensities, there was no evidence found to indicate that board quality and ethnic diversity affects corporate risk-taking.

Full Text:



Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

This journal is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

International Journal of Financial Research
ISSN 1923-4023(Print)ISSN 1923-4031(Online)


Copyright © Sciedu Press

To make sure that you can receive messages from us, please add the '' domain to your e-mail 'safe list'. If you do not receive e-mail in your 'inbox', check your 'bulk mail' or 'junk mail' folders.