

Financial Development and Economic Growth: Theory, Cross-Country Evidence, and the Transformative Role of Digital Finance

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Received: March 8, 2025

Accepted: April 20, 2025

Online Published: May 16, 2025

doi:10.5430/ijfr.v16n2p55

URL: <https://doi.org/10.5430/ijfr.v16n2p55>

Abstract

This paper surveys the theoretical foundations and empirical evidence linking financial development to long-run economic growth, and examines how the recent expansion of digital finance reshapes the finance–growth nexus. Since the seminal contributions of King and Levine (1993) and Levine (1997), a large body of cross-country, industry-level, and firm-level research has established a robust, first-order positive association between the depth, access, and efficiency of financial systems and the pace of capital accumulation, total factor productivity growth, and per-capita income growth. The paper first synthesizes the functions of financial systems and the mechanisms through which intermediation and market development raise long-run growth. It then reviews the aggregate evidence, including the influential cross-country studies and the more recent “too much finance” literature, which documents diminishing and ultimately negative growth effects beyond high levels of financial development. Using verified data from the World Bank Global Findex Database and the IMF Financial Development Index, the paper documents the marked expansion of global account ownership—from 51 percent of adults in 2011 to 76 percent in 2021—and the corresponding fall in the number of unbanked adults from 2.5 billion to 1.4 billion. It argues that digital finance, by lowering transaction costs and relaxing collateral constraints, represents a promising channel for extending financial services to underserved populations, while simultaneously introducing new risks to financial stability. The paper concludes with policy implications for sequencing financial deepening, investing in digital infrastructure, and calibrating regulation so that financial development supports rather than undermines sustainable growth.

Keywords: financial development, economic growth, financial inclusion, digital finance, cross-country evidence

1. Introduction

The relationship between the financial system and economic growth is one of the oldest and most contested questions in economics. Early development theorists often treated finance as a passive adjunct of the real economy, a “veil” that merely accommodated investment decisions made elsewhere, with real forces such as technology, preferences, and endowments determining the pace of development. Beginning with the work of Schumpeter on the role of credit in financing innovation, and subsequently formalized by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), the finance–growth literature has progressively overturned this view. Financial systems are now understood to perform a set of essential functions—mobilizing savings, allocating capital, monitoring borrowers, diversifying and managing risk, and facilitating transactions—that are directly relevant to the accumulation of physical and human capital and to the rate of technological change. Levine (1997) argued that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence points to a positive, first-order relationship between financial development and long-run growth.

The empirical agenda that followed has been remarkably productive. King and Levine (1993) documented that the initial level of financial development strongly predicts subsequent rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and productivity improvement across a large cross-section of countries. Using more credible identification strategies, Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) provided causal evidence that financial intermediation exerts a large and robust effect on growth, largely through improvements in total factor productivity. Rajan and Zingales (1998) showed that industries that are more dependent on external finance grow disproportionately faster in countries with more developed financial systems, providing a microeconomic channel for the aggregate findings. Taken together, this body of work transformed finance from a peripheral concern in growth economics to a central object of study and of development policy.

Two developments motivate a fresh appraisal of this literature. First, the “too much finance” debate, crystallized in the

work of Sahay and colleagues at the International Monetary Fund (Sahay et al., 2015), has shown that the growth dividend of financial deepening is non-monotonic: beyond relatively high levels of the financial development index, further expansion is associated with lower growth and greater macroeconomic volatility. This finding complicates the simple “more finance is better” prescription that guided policy for decades and raises questions about the appropriate target level of financial deepening for economies at different stages of development. Second, the rapid diffusion of digital financial services—mobile money, digital payments, and online lending—has created new channels through which financial access can be extended to the roughly 1.4 billion adults who remained unbanked in 2021 (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2022), challenging conventional measures of financial development that focus on traditional bank credit and raising the possibility that the growth benefits of finance can be delivered more inclusively and at lower cost.

This paper makes three contributions. First, it synthesizes the theoretical mechanisms and the aggregate, industry-level, and firm-level evidence on the finance–growth relationship, organizing a large and at times fragmented literature into a coherent framework. Second, it documents, using verified data, the global expansion of financial inclusion over the past decade and the structural shift toward digital delivery channels, and it links these trends to the conceptual apparatus of the finance–growth literature. Third, it assesses the extent to which digital finance can deliver the growth benefits traditionally associated with financial deepening while mitigating the risks identified by the “too much finance” literature. The paper is deliberately broad in scope: its aim is not to report a single new estimate but to provide an integrated assessment that is useful to students of the field and to policy makers. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical foundations. Section 3 reviews the empirical evidence. Section 4 examines the measurement of financial development and global patterns of financial inclusion. Section 5 analyzes digital finance and financial inclusion. Section 6 draws out policy implications, and Section 7 concludes.

2. Theoretical Foundations of the Finance–Growth Nexus

2.1 The Functions of Financial Systems

A useful way to organize the theory is to focus on the economically valuable functions that financial systems perform in the presence of transaction costs and information asymmetries. Levine (1997) enumerated five such functions. First, financial systems mobilize savings, pooling the dispersed resources of households and channeling them toward productive investment. Because individual savings are typically small and spatially scattered, without intermediaries they could not easily be gathered into the large, long-lived pools of capital that modern production requires. Second, they allocate capital by collecting information and selecting among competing investment projects, thereby improving the productivity with which resources are used. Intermediaries that specialize in the evaluation of borrowers reduce the cost of discovering profitable investment opportunities and direct funds toward their highest-return uses. Third, financial intermediaries monitor firms and exert corporate control, disciplining managers and reducing the moral hazard that arises when borrowers and lenders have divergent interests. Fourth, they facilitate the trading, pooling, and diversification of risk, allowing savers and entrepreneurs to insure against idiosyncratic shocks and thereby encouraging riskier, more productive investments. Fifth, they ease the exchange of goods and services by reducing the transaction costs associated with payments, which supports specialization and the division of labor.

The economic rationale for these functions rests on pervasive market frictions. Adverse selection arises when lenders cannot distinguish good from bad borrowers, driving up the cost of credit and rationing out creditworthy firms; moral hazard arises when borrowers, once funded, take on more risk than lenders intend; and costly state verification makes it difficult to enforce contracts. Financial intermediaries arise to address these frictions: by screening borrowers, monitoring projects, diversifying across many loans, and pooling information, they make it profitable to channel funds to productive uses that would otherwise go unfinanced. The value of these functions is greatest where frictions are most severe—typically in poor economies and among small, opaque borrowers.

Each of these functions lowers the frictions that would otherwise impede saving and investment. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) developed an influential model in which financial intermediation raises the rate of return on capital by providing information about investment opportunities, thereby accelerating growth; in turn, growth provides the resources needed to implement costly financial structures, so that intermediation and growth are jointly determined. This feedback between the real and financial sectors lies at the heart of the modern finance–growth nexus and implies that the relationship is inherently two-way: finance enables growth, and growth deepens finance. The joint determination of the two variables is one reason why establishing the causal direction in the data is difficult and why the identification strategies reviewed in Section 3 matter so much.

2.2 Mechanisms Linking Finance to Growth

The theory identifies several channels through which financial development raises the long-run rate of economic growth. The most direct channel operates through the accumulation of physical capital. By reducing transaction and information costs, an efficient financial system raises the net return to saving and improves the allocation of capital toward projects with the highest expected return, increasing both the level and the productivity of investment (King and Levine, 1993). In standard growth models, a higher saving rate and a more efficient allocation of investment translate into a higher steady-state level of output per worker and, during the transition, a faster rate of growth.

A second, increasingly emphasized channel operates through total factor productivity (TFP). Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) decomposed the growth effect of financial development and found that a large share operates through the rate of productivity growth rather than the mere accumulation of inputs. Financial development encourages the entry of new firms and the adoption of new technologies by easing the financing constraints that bind entrepreneurs and innovative incumbents. Because the largest productivity gains in developing economies often come from reallocating resources from low- to high-productivity firms, an inclusive financial system that channels credit to young and dynamic enterprises can generate outsized productivity dividends. Rajan and Zingales (1998) provided direct evidence for this channel: in countries with deeper financial systems, industries that depend heavily on external finance grow faster, consistent with finance relaxing the financing frictions that constrain technologically dynamic sectors.

A third channel concerns risk sharing and the smoothing of consumption. Financial systems allow households and firms to hedge against idiosyncratic risk, which encourages riskier but more productive investments and sustains consumption in the face of income shocks. In developing economies, where formal insurance markets are thin and income volatility is high, this function is especially valuable and, as Section 5 discusses, mobile money has emerged as a powerful vehicle for informal risk sharing (Jack and Suri, 2014). A fourth, distributional channel was emphasized by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007), who showed that financial development disproportionately raises the incomes of the poorest quintile and reduces income inequality, in part because the poor are most constrained by the absence of formal financial services. If finance mainly benefited the wealthy, its growth effects might be smaller than the aggregate estimates suggest; the distributional evidence indicates, however, that the poor gain disproportionately from access to financial services.

2.3 Financial Structure and the Composition of Finance

A long-standing debate concerns whether bank-based or market-based financial systems are more conducive to growth. Banks may be better suited to financing information-intensive borrowers and to providing relationship finance to small firms, whereas markets may be better suited to financing large, transparent corporations and to pricing risk. The modern consensus, articulated by Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008), is that the level of overall financial development matters more than the particular institutional form. What is important is the functioning of the financial system as a whole—the extent to which it mobilizes savings, allocates capital, and monitors borrowers—rather than whether banks or markets happen to dominate. This finding redirects policy attention from promoting a particular institutional model toward improving the efficiency and stability of the entire financial system.

The composition of finance nevertheless matters for the distribution of its benefits. Financial systems that are deep at the aggregate level but exclude large segments of the population may deliver growth without inclusion, while systems that broaden access—even at modest depth—may deliver more inclusive growth. This distinction between financial depth and financial inclusion is central to the contemporary debate and motivates the emphasis in Sections 4 and 5 on measures of access and on digital delivery channels. The multidimensional measurement framework developed by Svirydzenka (2016) and Čihák et al. (2012) explicitly separates depth, access, efficiency, and stability, recognizing that an economy can score highly on one dimension while lagging badly on others.

3. Empirical Evidence on Finance and Growth

3.1 Cross-Country and Panel Evidence

The modern empirical literature begins with King and Levine (1993), who constructed measures of financial development—such as the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP and the ratio of credit granted to private enterprises to GDP—for a sample of 80 countries over the period 1960–1989. They found that the initial level of financial development is strongly and robustly correlated with subsequent rates of per-capita GDP growth, physical capital accumulation, and productivity improvement, even after controlling for initial income and a standard set of growth determinants. The result was striking because the financial indicators were predetermined relative to subsequent growth, mitigating reverse causality. Equally important, the correlations held for measures of financial development that capture the intermediation of savings to the private sector rather than simply the size of the banking system,

strengthening the interpretation that finance actively promotes growth.

A central concern in this literature is that financial development is endogenous: countries that grow faster may simply develop deeper financial systems. Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) addressed this problem using instrumental variables derived from the legal origin of countries, reasoning that legal systems that protect creditors support the development of financial intermediaries. Their results confirmed a large causal effect of financial intermediation on growth, with the estimated magnitude exceeding that obtained from ordinary least squares. They further established that cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems help explain differences in financial development, linking the institutional environment to the finance–growth nexus. The finding that legal origin predicts financial development, and that the instrumented effect of finance on growth is even larger than the ordinary least squares estimate, is one of the most influential results in the field.

Subsequent panel studies employing generalized method of moments estimators, and more recently synthetic-control and quasi-experimental designs, have generally confirmed a positive but heterogeneous relationship. The magnitude of the effect varies with the stage of development, the structure of the financial system, and the quality of regulation. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008) summarized this evidence and emphasized that the growth effects depend on the functioning of the overall financial system—banks and markets together—rather than on any single institutional form. A recurring lesson is that the quality of the institutional and regulatory environment determines whether financial development translates into sustained growth or, instead, into instability and boom–bust cycles.

Two methodological developments have refined the cross-country evidence. The first is a recognition that the finance–growth relationship may be nonlinear, with the marginal effect of financial development depending on the initial level, the structure of the financial system, and the institutional environment. This has motivated the threshold and interaction specifications reviewed in Section 3.3. The second is a sustained effort to improve measurement, replacing single indicators with composite indices that capture depth, access, and efficiency simultaneously. Because different proxies can yield different conclusions, the credibility of the empirical literature rests on the consistency of results across alternative measures and estimation strategies. The fact that a broad set of proxies, samples, and methods points in the same direction is the strongest reason to take the finance–growth relationship seriously.

3.2 Industry- and Firm-Level Evidence

Aggregate regressions are complemented by evidence at the industry and firm level, which avoids some of the identification problems that afflict cross-country work. Rajan and Zingales (1998) is the canonical example: the authors measure an industry’s technological dependence on external finance using the financing patterns of large U.S. firms, then test whether industries that are more dependent on external finance grow faster in more financially developed countries. They find exactly this pattern, providing microeconomic support for the hypothesis that financial development relaxes external financing constraints and thereby promotes growth in financially dependent sectors. Because the comparison is within countries and across industries, many country-level confounders are absorbed, lending considerable credibility to the causal interpretation.

At the firm level, studies exploiting firm-level data show that access to finance is an important determinant of firm entry, investment, and innovation, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises that typically face the most severe financing constraints. Firms reporting that credit is a major obstacle invest less and grow more slowly, and reductions in the cost of credit are associated with increased entry and job creation. This firm-level evidence matters for policy because it identifies the margin along which improved financial access translates into real economic activity, and it underpins the contemporary emphasis on financial inclusion rather than financial depth alone. It also explains why digital lending platforms, which extend credit to small borrowers that banks have historically underserved, have attracted so much attention as potential engines of inclusive growth.

The firm- and industry-level evidence also speaks to the policy margin that matters most for financial inclusion. Because small and medium-sized enterprises are the most credit-constrained and the most numerous, improvements in their access to finance have the potential to generate large aggregate effects through the extensive margin of firm entry and the intensive margin of investment. The policy implication is that interventions should target the removal of the specific constraints—collateral requirements, documentation burdens, information gaps—that exclude small borrowers, rather than focusing solely on the aggregate size of the banking sector. This is precisely the margin on which digital lending platforms, which rely on alternative data rather than collateral, have sought to operate.

3.3 The “Too Much Finance” Debate

A more recent strand of the literature qualifies the linear view. Sahay et al. (2015) constructed a broad-based index of financial development following Svirydzienka (2016) and examined its relationship with growth across advanced,

emerging, and low-income economies over three decades. Their central finding is that the positive effect of financial development on growth begins to decline once the financial development index reaches a range of roughly 0.4 to 0.7, and becomes negligible or negative at very high levels (Figure 1). This “too much finance” pattern reflects the rising risks of financial crises, the misallocation of credit, and the diversion of talent toward the financial sector when finance grows beyond what the real economy can usefully absorb. The financial sector itself consumes resources—skilled labor, physical capital, and regulatory attention—and beyond some point these costs may outweigh the benefits of additional intermediation.

The implication is not that financial development is harmful on average, but that its marginal effect is diminishing and, for advanced economies with very deep financial systems, may turn negative. This non-monotonicity has important policy consequences: it cautions against the uncritical pursuit of ever-greater financial depth and redirects attention toward the composition, quality, and stability of financial services, and toward extending access to populations that remain underserved. It also suggests that for many emerging and low-income economies—where the financial development index remains well below the estimated optimum—deepening still offers substantial growth returns, provided it is pursued prudently. The estimated threshold of 0.4 to 0.7 is an average across countries, and the optimal level varies with country circumstances, but the qualitative message is clear: the relationship between finance and growth is not monotonically increasing.

Understanding the “too much finance” result requires appreciating the two faces of financial development. Finance improves the allocation of capital and the sharing of risk, but it also increases the economy’s exposure to financial crises, and financial crises are extremely costly, generating deep and prolonged recessions. Countries that expand financial systems rapidly, especially through credit booms, are more likely to experience banking crises and to suffer large output losses. The optimal level of financial development therefore balances the steady-state growth benefits of intermediation against the tail risks of instability, and the balance depends on the quality of regulation and supervision. This is why the policy debate has shifted from simply maximizing financial depth toward managing the composition and stability of financial development.




Figure 1. Financial development and long-run growth: the “too much finance” pattern (stylized, after Sahay et al., 2015)

4. Measuring Financial Development and Global Patterns

4.1 A Multidimensional Index of Financial Development

Early empirical work measured financial development using narrow indicators of financial depth, such as the ratio of private credit to GDP or stock market capitalization to GDP. While informative, these measures capture only one dimension of an inherently multidimensional phenomenon, and they can give a misleading picture of how well a financial system serves the economy. A country can have a large banking sector that lends mainly to a narrow set of large borrowers, or a large stock market that is accessible to only a fraction of the population. Svirydenka (2016)

addressed this limitation by constructing nine sub-indices that summarize how developed financial institutions and financial markets are along the dimensions of depth, access, and efficiency, aggregated into an overall index of financial development for 183 countries from 1980 onward. The underlying framework builds on the four-by-two classification introduced by Čihák et al. (2012), which organizes financial systems according to institutions versus markets and depth, access, efficiency, and stability.

The multidimensional index reveals considerable heterogeneity both across countries and over time. Advanced economies typically exhibit financial development indices above 0.7, reflecting deep, accessible, and efficient financial systems; emerging markets cluster in a middle range; and low-income countries often remain below 0.3, with financial access concentrated in a narrow segment of the population. This heterogeneity underscores that policies to promote financial development must be tailored to the prevailing level and structure of the financial system. For a low-income economy with an index below 0.3, the binding constraint is typically the absence of basic financial infrastructure and the thinness of financial markets; for an advanced economy with an index above 0.8, the marginal value of further depth is limited and the priorities are stability and access. The multidimensional framework thus provides both a diagnostic tool and a guide to policy priorities.

Although the multidimensional indices represent a major advance, they are not without limitations. Composite indices are only as good as the underlying indicators, and cross-country comparability is limited by differences in national statistical practices, definitions, and the coverage of informal financial activity. Because digital financial services are captured unevenly across countries, the indices may understate financial development in economies where mobile money and online platforms play a large role. These measurement challenges are particularly relevant in low-income economies, where informal finance remains important and where the shift toward digital delivery has been most rapid. Researchers and policy makers should therefore treat the indices as complements to, rather than substitutes for, country knowledge and detailed financial-sector data.

Despite these caveats, the multidimensional approach has become the standard framework for comparing financial systems and for analyzing their growth effects, and it has been widely adopted by international financial institutions. The distinction it draws between depth, access, efficiency, and stability has also proved useful for policy design, allowing countries to identify the dimensions in which their financial systems are weakest and to target reforms accordingly. The framework therefore serves both as a research tool and as a practical guide to financial-sector policy.

4.2 Global Trends in Financial Inclusion

Alongside the deepening of financial systems, the past decade witnessed a marked expansion of financial inclusion—the share of adults using formal financial services. The World Bank Global Findex Database (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2022) documents that the share of adults with an account at a financial institution or with a mobile money provider rose from 51 percent in 2011 to 76 percent in 2021 (Figure 2 and Table 1). The number of unbanked adults fell from approximately 2.5 billion in 2011 to 1.4 billion in 2021, a reduction of over one billion people in a decade. The expansion was most rapid in developing economies, where account ownership rose from 42 percent of adults in 2011 to 71 percent in 2021, driven by a combination of government policies, digital technology, and the entry of new financial service providers.




Figure 2. Global account ownership and the unbanked population, 2011–2021

Source: World Bank Global Findex Database

The expansion has been uneven across regions and population groups. Account ownership is nearly universal in high-income economies—exceeding 90 percent of adults—while remaining substantially lower in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Unbanked adults are disproportionately women, poorer, less educated, and more likely to live in rural areas. Gender gaps persist in many developing economies, and the unbanked are concentrated in a relatively small number of countries: a handful of economies account for more than half of the global unbanked population. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the adoption of digital payments, as governments transferred benefits digitally and households shifted away from cash. Digital payments increasingly serve as the primary channel through which new account holders use financial services, and the pandemic demonstrated that account ownership alone is insufficient for resilience unless accounts are actively used. Table 1 summarizes the headline indicators of global financial inclusion over 2011–2021.

Table 1. Global financial inclusion indicators, 2011–2021. Source: World Bank Global Findex Database (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2022).

Year	Account ownership (% of adults)	Unbanked (billions)	Unbanked (% of adults)
2011	51	2.5	35
2014	62	2.0	27
2017	69	1.7	23
2021	76	1.4	24

Three observations from the Findex data deserve emphasis. First, the rise in account ownership has been accompanied by a qualitative shift in how accounts are used: a growing share of adults in developing economies receive payments, remittances, and government transfers through digital channels, and a significant fraction of new account holders opened their accounts specifically to receive digital payments. Second, the reduction in the number of unbanked has slowed in recent years, suggesting that the remaining unbanked are harder to reach and require more than the provision of basic accounts—they need accessible, affordable, and trusted financial services. Third, ownership of an account is not the same as meaningful use; a substantial share of accounts in some economies remain inactive or used only for cash withdrawals. These observations shift the policy conversation from access per se toward usage, quality, and

relevance of financial services.

Two gaps deserve particular policy attention. The first is the gender gap in account ownership, which remains substantial in parts of South Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa; closing it would not only improve equity but also raise the aggregate demand for financial services and the depth of intermediation. The second is the digital divide within countries: even where mobile networks are widespread, the poorest and least educated adults are least likely to own a phone, to have access to the internet, or to trust digital financial services. Because digital finance increasingly depends on connectivity, investments in digital infrastructure must be accompanied by measures that make services accessible, affordable, and trustworthy for the most excluded groups.

5. Digital Finance, Financial Inclusion, and Growth

5.1 Channels of Digital Finance

Digital finance refers to financial services delivered through digital channels—mobile phones, the internet, and payment platforms—and includes mobile money, digital payments, online and mobile banking, and digital lending. It matters for the finance–growth nexus because it can extend financial services to populations that traditional branch-based banking has failed to reach, lowering the fixed costs of account provision and the variable costs of transactions. Whereas a traditional bank requires physical branches, staff, and account documentation to serve a customer, a mobile money provider can open an account through a simple registration on a phone and transact through an agent network. This dramatic reduction in the cost structure of basic financial services is the defining feature of digital finance and the source of its potential to deepen financial inclusion.

Khera et al. (2021) constructed indices of digital financial inclusion for 52 developing economies and showed that the exogenous component of digital financial inclusion is positively associated with growth in GDP per capita over 2011–2018. They identified access to digital infrastructure and the regulatory environment as key determinants of digital financial inclusion, and argued that digital finance can accelerate growth by expanding access to payments, savings, and credit for households and firms that were previously excluded. The distinction between traditional and digital channels is summarized in Table 2, which compares the growth mechanisms and the constraints each channel addresses. A central insight is that digital finance does not merely digitize existing services; it changes the economics of financial service provision in ways that make it viable to serve low-balance, remote, and informal customers who were previously unprofitable.

Digital finance is not a single technology but a family of services with different economics and different implications for growth. Mobile money, which is built on the simple model of storing and transferring value through mobile phones and an agent network, has been the most successful in extending basic payments and savings to low-income populations. Digital payments connect households and firms to the formal economy and create transaction records that can support credit assessment. Online banking lowers the cost of account management for the banked, while digital lending platforms use alternative data to serve borrowers that lack credit histories. Each of these services lowers a specific barrier, and their growth effects depend on which barrier is binding in a particular economy.

Table 2. Traditional versus digital finance: channels to growth.

Dimension	Traditional finance	Digital finance
Primary delivery	Branches, banks, microfinance institutions	Mobile money, digital payments, online platforms
Key barrier addressed	Savings mobilization, credit allocation	Transaction costs, account-opening fixed costs
Growth mechanism	Capital accumulation, TFP via credit allocation	Financial inclusion, payments, informal risk sharing
Infrastructure need	Physical branches, credit registries	Telecoms, mobile networks, digital IDs
Main risk	Credit booms, banking crises	Cybersecurity, data privacy, financial stability

5.2 Mobile Money and Development: The Kenyan Experience

The best-documented illustration of the growth effects of digital finance is the expansion of M-Pesa, a mobile money service launched in Kenya in 2007. Jack and Suri (2014) exploited the staggered expansion of M-Pesa across locations to show that mobile money substantially reduced the transaction costs of remitting funds, enabling households to share risk and smooth consumption in response to income shocks. In their panel sample, adverse shocks reduced consumption by roughly seven percent for non-users, whereas the consumption of user households was unaffected, implying that mobile money improved welfare by facilitating risk sharing across households. The design exploited the differential timing of M-Pesa rollout across geographic areas, providing credible evidence that the welfare gains were causal rather than merely correlated with the adoption of mobile money.

The Kenyan experience generalizes to a broader set of developing economies. In Sub-Saharan Africa, mobile money accounts have grown rapidly, and in several economies a substantial share of adults use only a mobile money account, having no account at a traditional financial institution. Mobile money has enabled households to save more safely, to smooth consumption against shocks, and to receive remittances at lower cost. The IMF Financial Access Survey documents that the value of mobile and internet banking transactions rose from about 225 percent of GDP to 324 percent of GDP in middle-income countries between 2019 and 2021, evidence of the accelerating shift toward digital delivery of financial services. For low-income households, digital finance lowers the threshold for participating in the formal financial system and, by creating transaction histories, can eventually facilitate access to credit.

The growth effects of mobile money extend beyond risk sharing. By providing a safe store of value and a low-cost payments rail, mobile money encourages saving, reduces the cost of receiving remittances, and facilitates the payment of bills, school fees, and government transfers. For small firms, mobile money lowers the cost of accepting payments and managing cash, and transaction histories can serve as a basis for credit scoring. The expansion of mobile money has therefore been associated not only with improved household welfare but also with increased firm activity and greater integration of the informal sector into the formal financial system.

5.3 Digital Credit, Infrastructure, and Emerging Risks

The growth of digital payments has been accompanied by the emergence of digital credit, in which loans are extended through mobile and online platforms based on alternative data such as transaction histories, mobile phone usage, and behavioral signals. Digital credit can reach borrowers who lack formal credit histories and collateral, potentially easing the financing constraints that bind small enterprises and low-income households. At the same time, it raises new concerns about consumer protection, over-indebtedness, and data privacy. The rapid growth of digital lending in several markets, followed by episodes of high default rates and distress among borrowers, underscores the need for regulatory frameworks that protect consumers without stifling innovation.

The success of digital finance depends on complementary infrastructure. Mobile networks and affordable handsets are necessary for mobile money; interoperable payment systems allow customers to transact across providers; digital identity systems reduce the cost of customer verification; and reliable digital and telecommunications infrastructure supports online banking. Where such infrastructure is weak, the promise of digital finance remains unrealized. The interaction between the financial system and the digital economy thus represents a new frontier in the finance–growth literature: the growth dividend of financial development increasingly depends on the quality of the digital economy that delivers it.

5.4 Digital Finance and Financial Stability

The diffusion of digital finance also has implications for financial stability that are not yet fully understood. On the positive side, digital payments can increase the efficiency of the payments system, improve the monitoring of financial flows, and support the transmission of monetary policy. On the negative side, rapid credit growth through digital platforms can generate credit booms that outpace the capacity of borrowers to repay, and the reliance of some platforms on alternative data raises concerns about the quality of underwriting. Cybersecurity failures and data breaches can undermine trust in the financial system and threaten operational stability. Because digital finance is a relatively new phenomenon, the accumulation of evidence on its stability implications is an urgent research priority.

Regulators face a particular challenge in balancing innovation and stability. Overly restrictive regulation can stifle the development of services that extend financial inclusion, while inadequate regulation can allow the risks of digital credit and payments to accumulate. Many economies are therefore adopting a phased, risk-based approach, licensing digital financial service providers, setting proportionate capital and consumer-protection requirements, and monitoring the growth of digital credit. International coordination matters as well, because digital financial services often operate across borders and because data protection and cyber-risk frameworks require common standards.

6. Policy Implications

The survey yields four policy implications. First, the growth dividend of financial development is real but diminishing. For economies in which the financial system remains shallow, deepening—particularly through improved access and efficiency rather than sheer size—remains a powerful engine of growth. For advanced economies already at high levels of financial development, the marginal gains from further expansion are small, and policy should emphasize stability and the quality of intermediation over aggregate size (Sahay et al., 2015). The “too much finance” literature implies that there is an optimal level of financial development that varies with country circumstances, and that policy should aim to move toward that optimum rather than to maximize financial depth indiscriminately.

Second, financial inclusion deserves priority alongside financial depth. The evidence that financial development disproportionately benefits the poor (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2007) implies that policies extending access to the unbanked can improve both growth and equity. The roughly 1.4 billion unbanked adults in 2021 represent a large reservoir of unmet demand for savings, payments, and credit, and their inclusion is likely to raise aggregate productivity by relaxing the constraints that bind small enterprises and low-income households. Policies that promote inclusion include simplified account-opening requirements, government transfers through accounts, and financial literacy programs that help new account holders use their accounts productively rather than simply holding them.

Third, digital finance offers a cost-effective route to inclusion, but it requires complementary investment in digital infrastructure, interoperable payment systems, digital identity, and consumer-protection frameworks. The experience of mobile money demonstrates that regulatory permissiveness, combined with a competitive telecommunications sector, can catalyze rapid adoption. At the same time, the risks of digital finance—cybersecurity threats, data privacy concerns, and the potential for rapid credit growth to fuel financial instability—require proactive and adaptive regulation. Regulators must balance the benefits of innovation against the need to protect consumers and maintain financial stability, and the balance must be recalibrated as digital finance evolves.

Fourth, the institutional environment is a binding constraint on the finance–growth nexus. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008) showed that legal and regulatory institutions shape both the level of financial development and its effect on growth. Reforms that strengthen creditor rights, contract enforcement, accounting standards, and financial supervision therefore complement policies aimed at deepening financial systems or expanding digital access. Financial development is not a purely technical matter of building bigger markets; it is fundamentally about building the institutional foundations—law, information, and governance—on which sound finance rests. For digital finance in particular, legal clarity on data ownership, privacy, and liability is essential to harness its benefits while managing its risks.

Finally, policy must be sequenced and tailored to national circumstances. For low-income economies, the priority is to build the basic financial and digital infrastructure that enables access in the first place; for emerging markets, the priority is to deepen access while strengthening supervision and crisis-prevention frameworks; and for advanced economies, the priority is to manage the risks of very deep financial systems and to ensure that digital finance serves the segments of the population that remain excluded. There is no single blueprint, but the analytical framework of this paper—distinguishing depth, access, efficiency, and stability, and recognizing the diminishing returns to depth—provides a structure within which country-specific strategies can be designed.

7. Conclusion

This paper has surveyed the theory and evidence on the relationship between financial development and economic growth, and examined the role of digital finance in reshaping that relationship. The theoretical literature identifies a set of functions—savings mobilization, capital allocation, monitoring, risk diversification, and transaction facilitation—through which financial systems raise long-run growth. The empirical literature, from cross-country regressions to industry-level and firm-level studies, confirms a robust positive association that operates substantially through productivity growth. The evidence also cautions that the relationship is non-monotonic: beyond high levels of financial development, further expansion is associated with diminishing and potentially negative growth effects.

The past decade has witnessed a structural transformation of the financial landscape. Global account ownership rose from 51 percent of adults in 2011 to 76 percent in 2021, and the number of unbanked adults fell by more than one billion. Digital finance has been central to this transformation, extending financial services to populations that traditional banking failed to reach. The evidence, exemplified by mobile money in Kenya, suggests that digital finance can deliver the growth and welfare benefits traditionally associated with financial development while expanding access to underserved groups. At the same time, digital finance introduces new risks—cybersecurity, data privacy, and rapid credit growth—that require careful management.

The policy challenge is to harness these benefits while managing the associated risks. This requires a balanced approach that pursues financial deepening where the financial system is still shallow, prioritizes inclusion and the quality of intermediation, invests in the infrastructure that digital finance requires, and strengthens the institutional and regulatory environment that ultimately determines whether financial development supports sustainable, inclusive growth. Future research should continue to track the growth effects of digital finance as adoption matures, and to assess how the new risks it introduces interact with the stability objectives that the “too much finance” literature has brought to the fore. The integration of digital finance into the broader finance–growth framework is likely to be one of the most productive agendas in the field over the coming decade.

Several limitations of this survey should be acknowledged. The paper synthesizes a large literature but does not report new empirical estimates, and its conclusions rest on the evidence that the cited studies provide. The analysis of digital finance is necessarily forward-looking, and the growth effects of digital financial services are likely to evolve as adoption matures and as business models and regulatory frameworks develop. Future work should also examine the distributional consequences of digital finance more closely, including whether it closes or widens the gaps between rich and poor, men and women, and urban and rural households. These questions will define the next generation of research on the finance–growth nexus.

Authors’ contributions

I’m the sole author of this article.

Competing interests

The author declares that he has no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Informed consent

Obtained.

Ethics approval

The Publication Ethics Committee of the Sciedu Press.

The journal and publisher adhere to the Core Practices established by the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE).

Provenance and peer review

Not commissioned; externally double-blind peer reviewed.

Data availability statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy or ethical restrictions.

Data sharing statement

No additional data are available.

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