Incentive Contract between Banks and B2B Platform in Online Agricultural Product Supply Chain Finance

Abstract

Online agricultural supply chain finance, as an effective way to solve the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized agricultural enterprises in the chain, has made rapid progress in recent years, and the cooperation between banks and e-commerce has become the mainstream mode. Taking the electronic order pledge of agricultural products as an example, this paper discusses the incentive contract design between banks and B2B platform from the perspective of moral hazard prevention and the use of principal-agent theory. In this paper, the principal-agent model is constructed by considering the bank's effort and no effort, and then give the optimal incentive coefficient and fixed return. The results show that banks’ effort will increase the level of efforts of B2B platform, but also increase their own variable payment; under the given conditions, the bank’s effort will increase its income, and at a certain level of effort, the largest increase in revenue, In addition, improving the application level of B2B data processing technology and the degree of data pledge development will contribute to the increase of incentive coefficient and revenue.