Game Analysis between Banks and B2B Platforms in Agricultural Electronic Order Financing

Xiaoxu Chen, Peng Xu


In recent years, agricultural electronic order financing has developed rapidly, and cooperation between banks and B2B platforms has become the main mode of operation. In the process of cooperation, there are moral hazards caused by information concealment. On the basis of analyzing the business characteristics and the behavior strategies of both sides, this paper discusses the cooperation mechanism between the two sides by using the game analysis method. The results show that the strategy choice of the banks and the B2B platforms is not only affected by the credit of financing customers, but also by the concealment cost and the concealment income. When the concealment cost is less than the concealment income, the profit distribution ratio and the default compensation ratio can be the key factors of affecting the strategy choice of the B2B platforms and the banks. When the concealment cost is greater than the concealment benefit, the change value of the income distribution caused by the different strategies has an important impact on the strategy choice of the banks.

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Business and Management Research
ISSN 1927-6001 (Print)   ISSN 1927-601X (Online)

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